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THE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT AND YOUTH
LEE

E.

TEITELBAUM*

There has been for some time a sense that assurance of equal
rights, benefits and opportunities is primarily a matter of national
rather than local responsibility-a sense strengthened if not created by
the campaign against racial discrimination conducted by federal agencies against reluctant and often hostile local authorities. The burden of
enforcing claims to racial equality rested primarily with the federal
courts, at least initially. Congress was viewed, probably accurately, as
limited in its ability to act by its representative character and by judicially imposed limitations on its power to act except where federal interests were substantially involved. It was accordingly the federal
judiciary that led the national struggle against racial inequality, first by
striking down discriminatory laws and practices' and then by confirming congressional power to address racial discrimination through legislation that might earlier have been considered an unconstitutional
2
invasion of state prerogatives.
The principal congressional function in dealing with racial discrimination during this time lay in implementing constitutional decisions that invalidated inequalities of treatment based on color. This
was surely an important role for Congress to perform, since it could
broadly address practices that the courts could adjudicate only on a
case-by-case basis. 3 Nevertheless, enactment of antidiscrimination legislation was largely responsive to judicial action in the field, or at least
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico; B.A., LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M.,
Northwestern University. The author wishes to express deep gratitude to his colleagues last year
at the Indiana University School of Law, Professors Harry Pratter and Julia Lamber, and to Ms.
Ruth Luckasson of the Center for The Study of Legal Policy Relating to Children at Indiana
University, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
I. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(per curiam) (golf courses); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (public schools).
2. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), upholding congressional power under the commerce clause
to prohibit racial discrimination in places of public accommodation through heightened deference
to congressional findings that certain activities have a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce.
3. Constitutional adjudication primarily involves judgments about the validity of particular
laws, leaving it to local authorities to work out how any invalidity will be cured. The local solution may, of course, be challenged if it is not thought satisfactory, but the process of doing so is
necessarily fragmentary and laborious. Congress, in contrast, could and did address programs
broadly and its decisions were given detailed articulation through administrative interpretation
and enforcement.
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did not embody a different notion of equality than that evolved by the
courts.
Recently, however, Congress has come to be viewed as an independent vehicle for eliminating perceived inequalities in the treatment of groups, rather than merely as an enforcement agency for court
decisions. Both political and doctrinal reasons account for this shift.
The former include a decrease in the activism of the Supreme Court
together with an increase in the amenability of Congress to appeals
from organized and politically visible minority groups. The doctrinal
limitations on judicial action have always been present. "Discrimination," in the sense of differential treatment of groups, is not usually or
even presumptively invalid as a contitutional matter. Many laws "discriminate" in some way, and most are subject to successful challenge
only when they are invidious in the sense of arising from plainly improper motivation or, what suggests the same thing, are arbitrary in
that the classification used lacks factual relationship to accomplishment
of some legitimate state purpose. Moreover, unless laws incorporating
unequal treatment restrict the exercise of a "fundamental right" 4 or
rely upon a "suspect classification" such as race or national origin, 5 a
heavy burden lies upon litigants to show that the statutory differentiation is "irrational" in light of the governmental purposes it purports to
serve.
Accordingly, constitutional attacks on laws or practices that do not
employ a suspect classification or trench upon fundamental rights will
rarely have the success experienced by challenges to racial discrimination. Congressional intervention is now sought, not to implement some
constitutionally-established interest in equality, but to declare such an
interest independent of constitutional doctrine. The power of Congress
in this respect is considerable. It can directly require a state to provide
6
equal opportunities where the activity affects interstate commerce.
Even when it lacks direct power, Congress can condition the receipt of
federal funds by state and local governments on such action. To the
4. "Fundamental rights" are a judicially-created class of interests entitled to special protection against governmental interference. Among these rights are the franchise, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); certain claims of privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and freedom of
speech and the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
5. Suspect classifications focus on groups that have historically been subject to discrimina-

tory treatment and are powerless to affect the political decisions upon which this treatment depends. Race and alienage are the traditional categories. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(race); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (alienage).
6. See, e.g., cases cited in note 2 supra, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (prohibiting discrimination in employment
as an exercise of commerce clause power).
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very great extent that state and local entities depend upon federal
assistance, the passage of federal laws insisting upon equal treatment of
some group by recipient agencies will have much the same effect as a
direct declaration of a national policy of equality. Thus, federal legislation has gone far toward reducing discrimination against women in
education, employment and other activities without either a federal
Equal Rights Amendment or true "strict scrutiny" of laws treating men
and women differently. 7 Similarly, efforts to reduce "discrimination"
against the physically and mentally handicapped have generally been
directed to Congress, which has responded with laws requiring not only
"even-handed" treatment but the provision by states of a variety of resources to assure that handicapped persons will be able to participate
"equally" in educational and other opportunities. 8
The Age Discrimination Act of 19759 represents a similar appeal
for an independent congressional declaration of rights to equality that
could not have been secured generally through consitutional litigation.
As with physical and mental disability,' 0 as well as with gender for
some considerable time," there was good reason to think that statutes
or practices differentiating by age would rarely be invalidated. This
perception was, it should be said, accurate. In Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia,12 decided the year after passage of the Act, the
Supreme Court made clear that its short list of "suspect classifications"
would not be extended to include old age.' 3 Under a relaxed standard
of review, the Court upheld against equal protection claims a rule requiring retirement of uniformed police at age 50, finding that the practice rationally furthered a legitimate governmental objective of
7. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), affords a middle-level scrutiny for classification involving gender, and even that level was declared only after much of the congressional activity had
already taken place.
8. Eg., Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
10. These disabilities have never been held to require strict scrutiny, and relief from unequal
treatment has come from Congress rather than the courts. See generally Krass, The Right to Public
Educationfor Handicapped Children: A Primerfor the NewAdvocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016.
11. The Supreme Court vacillated for some time on the question of the standard for review
of laws classifying by gender. No sex-based classification was declared invalid on equal protection grounds until 1971, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and the Court did not settle on a
"middle" level of scrutiny for such classifications until 1976, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
However, this case was decided after Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, prohibiting
sex discrimination in federally assisted educational programs, had been adopted by Congress. 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
12. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
13. The Court explained that "old age does not define a 'discrete and insular' group. . . in
need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political processes.'" 427 U.S. at 313
(citation omitted).
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assuring physical fitness among its uniformed police force. As is always true under a "rational basis" standard, the desirability and wisdom of the state practice was not before the Court:
"[Wle do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is wise,
that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that
[Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised." . . . We decide only that the
system enacted by the Massachusetts
Legislature does not deny apel4
lee equal protection of the laws.'
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken so directly concerning the constitutional status of youth rather than old age, it is clear that
this condition will likewise be excluded from strict scrutiny. The Court
has routinely held that states have broader power to regulate the behavior of children than that of adults 15 and has indicated as well that
even laws restricting fundamental liberties will be subject to a standard
of review somewhat below traditional strict scrutiny when young peo16
ple are involved.
Since age distinctions by themselves would ordinarily be upheld as
a constitutional matter, 17 it fell to Congress to address discrimination
on this basis. The primary thrust of the Age Discrimination Act was
addressed to discrimination against the elderly who, it was believed,
frequently lacked access to services and opportunities available to other
groups.' 8 Like other congressional nondiscrimination laws, the Act's
most obvious purpose was to clarify and implement congressional intent regarding allocation of resources by agencies relying on federal
funding and particularly to declare an intention that older qualified
persons should not be denied access to those resources. 19 It is also
probable that, like other such laws, the Act has a second and broader
purpose: to declare as a matter of principle that age, like race or sex,
should not be used as a ground for treating people differently, at least
when differential treatment is disadvantageous. To be sure, the extent
of agreement regarding this latter goal is unclear; however, there is con14. Id. at 317 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
15. Eg., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (opinion of Brennan, J.);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
170 (1944).
16. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n. 15 (1977) (opinion of Brennan,
J.); Teitelbaum & Ellis, The Liberty Interest ofChildren: Due Process Rights and TheirApplication,
12 FoA. L.Q. 153, 165-66 (1978).
17. Of course, if age limitations are also related to some other characteristic, such as gender,
unequal treatment may be struck down. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
18. See S. Rep. No. 225, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1252, 1272.
19. H.R. Rep. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975).
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siderable evidence to suggest that this statute was viewed as an early

salvo in a general campaign against age discrimination. 20 The House
Report, in particular, contains a direct statement that "ageism" (its
term) is as intolerable as "racism" and "sexism" and expresses the hope
that passage of the Age Discrimination Act would demonstrate that
"our government believes that an individual should be judged on his or
her merits and not on the basis of such irrelevant factors as age, sex,
race, color, religion, or national origin." 2 1 It is also relevant to this
latter purpose that the Act closely resembles other federal statutes that
plainly seek to eliminate particular forms of discrimination as a matter
22
of national policy.

To this point, the Age Discrimination Act is an interesting but

hardly novel example of recent strategies for pursuing claims to equality. The ADA possesses, however, a feature that is not found in other

such laws: it extends not only to the politically visible group which
sought its passage-the elderly and their spokesmen 23-but

to an even

larger group that was not represented before Congress, the young. In
terms, the Age Discrimination Act prohibits "unreasonable discrimina24

tion" against against all age groups by federally supported programs,

a breadth of coverage that was clearly intentional. 25 What is not clear
is why the drafters of the legislation decided to include discrimination
against youth in the Act; debates and committee reports are entirely
silent on this subject beyond the fact that the law is indeed intended to

ban all age discrimination.
Left to speculation, several hypotheses of varying likelihood and

cogency might explain the reach of the Act. It may have seemed inap20. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), was
the first effort in the area, but addressed only discrimination against older persons between the
ages of 40 and 65. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976). The Act was amended in 1978 to increase the age limit
to 70. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
21. H.R. Rep. No. 67, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. at 16; 121 Cong. Rec. 9212 (1975) (remarks of
Rep. Brademas).
22. See Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law.- The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89
YALE L.J. 27, 29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schuck]. Most notably, the Age Discrimination Act
resembles provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (aimed
at racial discrimination); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686
(1976) (prohibiting sex discrimination in federally supported educational programs); and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination in federally supported programs on the basis of physical or mental handicaps).
23. It has been suggested that the elderly group, unlike any other minority groups, has a
substantial constituency outside its own ranks: those who near old age. Schuck, supra note 22, at
41, (quoting P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 178 (1976)).

24. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1976) states that:
It is the purpose of this chapter to prohibit unreasonable discrimination on the basis of
age in programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance. ...
25. H.R. Rep. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975).
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propriate to prohibit a wrong against one end of the age continuum
without showing the same concern for the treatment of those at the
other end. Perhaps the Act itself would have appeared guilty of age
discrimination had it been limited to older persons. Beyond an interest
in symmetry, Congress may also have believed that children are subject
to discrimination in the delivery of services in the same ways, and to
the same extent, as older citizens. While there was no evidence on this
point before the legislature, there was little hard evidence before them
generally. However, the existence of age discrimination was assumed
and, on that assumption, the United States Civil Rights Commission
was ordered to conduct an empirical study documenting its extent and
character. 26 The drafters presumably anticipated that the Commission
would find inequality in treatment of both old and young people, an
expectation supported to some degree by the general experience that we
routinely and cheerfully treat children differently from adults for almost every social purpose. Finally, we must suppose that Congress
considered the situation of young and old people sufficiently similar
that both could appropriately be covered by a single declaration of national policy.
The Age Discrimination Act announces, then, a policy of treating
young people (and old people) equally with the rest of the population,
as other nondiscrimination laws do for the constituents they address.
The following discussion explores the premises of such a policy, and
particularly of the notions that young people are indeed denied "equality" and that they are entitled to equal treatment in the same way that
adults and elderly people may be said to be so entitled. Ultimately, it
will appear that these premises cannot be justified, at least in the context of a general nondiscrimination statute. To the extent that the Act
is intended to assure that children receive an appropriate share of societal goods and services, it offers no definition by which one could conclude that they do not fairly receive those services. To the extent that it
is designed to declare that children are generally entitled to treatment
as the equals of other age groups, there is every reason to doubt that
such a declaration was meant sincerely. And, finally, to the extent that
the Act directly associates provision or denial of services with equality
of treatment, the law is inaccurate.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 6106 (1976). The formal purpose of the study was to facilitate "a final resolution by the Congress of the difficult policy issues that are left undecided by this legislation." H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 670, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59, reprintedM [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1290, 1326.
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THE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT AND THE DEFINITION OF EQUALITY

The shift from constitutional to legislative declarations of equal
treatment, of which the Age Discrimination Act is one instance, involves more than a choice among differentially responsive agencies.
Legislative establishment of rights to equality reflects fundamentally
different considerations than those ordinarily raised by constitutional
adjudication. The fourteenth amendment does not itself contain a normative statement of the meaning of equality. 27 At the most, the equal
protection clause embodies a threshold proposition that like cases
should be treated in like manner, except perhaps when fundamental
rights or suspect classifications are touched upon. While this principle
is of great importance, it does not serve as a substantive definition of
equality. It does not, for example, tell us which cases are like and
which are unlike, for what purposes dissimilarities are relevant,
whether there are respects in which all persons must be treated alike, or
answer a host of other distributive questions. The task of resolving
these specific issues is ordinarily left to state law or practice, which establishes the meaning of equality for a particular purpose. The court's
function in a constitutional challenge is only to decide whether the state
definition of like and unlike groups is one that could reasonably have
been reached. Equal protection is thus served when a state has chosen
any plausible notion of equality, and not only when it has chosen the
best or wisest (or even a good and wise) definition from among alternative possible formulations.
Congressional nondiscrimination legislation, on the other hand,
does purport to define a norm of equality to which state agencies relying on federal funding must conform. It is not enough that the latter
has adopted a rule or practice that is a rational interpretation of the
meaning of equality; its interpretation must also coincide with Congress' own notion, as expressed in the statute itself or through administrative regulations. 28 This difference is reflected in the nature of the
issue before courts called upon to decide whether a state practice conforms to congressional requirements. The court is not limited to asking, as it is with constitutional claims, whether the state rule is rational
given the state's purpose for acting, but now inquires into the consistency of that rule with the congressional understanding of equality.
27. But see Karst, Foreword Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1977), suggesting that the equal protection clause substantively assures rights to equal

citizenship.
28. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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Accordingly, legislation of this kind must be viewed as an independent
statement of rights to equality which will be more or less binding on a
variety of state and local governmental activties. Plainly, what a nondiscrimination act promises by way of equality for the groups it addresses is a matter of considerable national importance.
It would, therefore, be useful to settle on what Congress meant by
equality for young and old persons in connection with the Age Discrimination Act. The most convenient approach would lie in reference
to the definition of discrimination employed by Congress. However,
the Age Discrimination Act itself provides little guidance regarding the
nature of the condition-"unreasonable discrimination"--that it undetakes to address. While "reasonable" use of age criteria is allowed,
the statute provides no basis for telling when an age distinction is "reasonable" and when it is not.
The first, somewhat official, effort to define discrimination expressly in connection with the Age Discrimination Act is found in the
study conducted at Congress' direction by the Civil Rights Commission. 29 Formally, the Commission took age discrimination to mean
"any act or failure to act, or any law or policy that adversely affects an
individual on the basis of age."' 30 This seems, however, a less than useful definition for several reasons. In the first place, the statutory notion
of "reasonableness" was eliminated, almost without discussion. In the
second, the resulting standard has small literal or conceptual meaning.
Viewed literally, it is hard to see how people can be affected, adversely
or not, on the basis of age. They may, however, be denied something
on the basis of age, which adversely affects them, and this will be taken
as the meaning of the Commission's definition. A second problem in
meaning is raised by the focus on harm to individuals. Initially, it may
seem that the Commission only defined as discrimination an act that
could be shown to have worked actual harm to an individual. This
would be far too narrow a notion of discrimination, and is plainly inconsistent with the broad operational definitions adopted by the Com29. The Commission's conclusions appeared in two reports, the first issued in 1977 and the
second in 1979. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,THE AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY (1977) [hereinafter cited as AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART I)]; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AGE DisCRIMINATION STUDY, PART 11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART 11)].
In fairness, it should be said that the Commission was handed an extraordinarily difficult
assignment. Not only was the statute itself of little help in defining the nature of the investigation,
but few programs had collected data in such a way that program performance by age could be

determined or compared with data from other programs.
30. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART I), upra note 29, at 3; AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II),
supra note 29, at 5.
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mission. 3' Accordingly, the most sensible reading of the standard for
discrimination is that it includes any act, omission, law or policy that
denies persons, on the basis of age, services they may be said to
deserve.
This last construction is also consistent with the Commission's operational definition of discrimination, which means little more than a
count, by age group, of beneficiaries of programs and a comparison of
the age distribution of actual beneficiaries of a program with the distribution of those thought eligible for that program. In the case of multiple service programs, discrimination was examined by comparing by
age the number of beneficiaries served by the various components of
32
the program.
The difficulty is that discrimination, so defined, provides no conceptual boundaries. A mathematical or literal notion of equality,
granting a proportionate share of benefits to all persons or groups in
the population, is only sensible (if at all) where there is no limitation to
the benefits granted. It is sometimes said that this is true for political
benefits, such as the franchise, which can be given equally to all without cost to any other person. 33 Even that decision, it should be added,
does not indisputably provide "equality," since a case can be made that
there are some persons (e.g., children or aliens) who are not equal in
their capacity to vote and therefore cannot properly be treated as equal
for this purpose. In the almost universal situation where resources are
indeed limited or where grants of liberties to some involve costs to
others' interests, strict proportionality of distribution would often be
thought wrong and unequal. Suppose, for example, that a medical
services program could provide treatment for 1,000 people suffering
from a disease which is potentially fatal in young persons but only uncomfortable in older people. The Commission's definition would apparently count as discrimination a decision to reserve this medication
for younger patients. To do so, however, treats as "equal" people
whose needs are very different. It is not a useful notion of equality that
treats in the same way a person who is gravely ill and one who is not.
31. The operational definitions of discrimination adopted by the Commission include,
among other things, any situation where (1) the age distribution of program beneficiaries differs
from the distribution of those eligible to benefit; (2) the age distribution of applicants differs from
the age distribution of those eligible to benefit; (3) the age distribution of those receiving benefits
differs from the age distribution of those applying; and (4) where a program provides more than
one service, the extent to which the age distributions of the separate services' beneficiaries differ
from one another. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II), supra note 29, at 6.
32. See note 31 supra.
33. See R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
DwoRKN].
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To hospitalize the latter because we would hospitalize the former is
merely unnecessary; to divide the only available dose of medicine be34
tween them is considerably worse.
It should be added that the Commission's study could not accurately answer even the question it put to itself regarding proportional
distribution. Its inquiry focussed on nine specific programs, each of
which was examined as if its services were the exclusive source of
assistance for persons with the problems to which the programs were
directed. No attention was directed to the other agencies that might
also supply services that were comprehended by the program under investigation, a circumstance that might justify the latter in concentrating
(i e., allocating disproportionately) its resources to otherwise unserved
age groups. Moreover, the Commission did not consider the total resources devoted to various age groups for all purposes by all programs.
Given finite governmental wealth, proportionate distribution might
well be said to be provided if all groups received their appropriate rate
of the total available wealth or of the total available opportunities for
wealth. Under the operational and formal definitions used, however, it
would seemingly be discriminatory for either young or old persons to
be denied age-proportionate access to a single program, even if that
same group received 75% of all governmental resources distributed to
the population.
A third official definition of equality under the Age Discrimination
Act is found in the regulations adopted by the then Department of
Health, Education and Welfare to implement the Act. 35 These regulations begin with a general statement of the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of age and then set out a number of qualifications to
the general rule. Most notably, the Act is interpreted as not applying to
age distinctions used to confer special benefits on members of particular age groups, an endorsement of "affirmative action" 36 which raises
its own questions of equality when large shares of a finite pool of resources are allocated to one group or another. Moreover, the general
rule is subject to significant exceptions for programs which "reasonably" use age as an indicator of other characteristics that are relevant to
34. This suggests the necessary connection between equality and justice. We are not concerned with a mathematical notion, but rather with distributions that comport with a sense of
fairness. It has been agreed since the time of Plato and Aristotle that "literal" or mathematical
equality is an inadequate definition of equality for purposes of law and justice. See Vlastos,
Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 31, 31-34 (R. Brandt ed. 1962). See also Stone, Equal
Protection and the Searchfor Justice, 22 Aaiz. L. REv. 1 (1980).
35. 45 C.F.R. §§ 90.1-90.62 (1979).
36. Id. § 90.3.
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the program but cannot directly be measured on an individual basis, 37
or which use non-age factors that are associated with age but bear a
direct and substantial relationship to the normal activity of the program. 38 Plainly, the HEW regulations reflect a very different understanding of discrimination from that of the Civil Rights Commission,
and rely on broad exceptions to escape the stringency of the Commission's approach. It is fair to ask, however, whether the Department has
supplied a useful notion of discrimination beyond that which courts
would apply. To the extent that age is often a "reasonable" measure or
approximation of maturity, knowledge, strength, agility, need or any
other characteristic that might be relevant to some agency's operation,
the Act as interpreted would add little to what constitutional scrutiny
accomplishes beyond, perhaps, strengthening the degree of relationship
required. While there presumably exists some congressional definition
of "reasonableness" that might differ from the Constitution's "rationality," the regulations thus far do not clearly indicate what that definition
might be.
We are left, therefore, without any consistent or sure sense of what
discrimination and equality mean within the context of the Age Discrimination Act. Lacking such a meaning, it is impossible to talk about
what the Act contributes to defining the places of young and old people
in society. It would perhaps seem appropriate, therefore, to substitute
for these official definitions some other, generally agreed meaning of
equality and examine the significance of age discrimination legislation
on that basis. The difficulty with this approach is that "equality" can
mean a number of different things, any of which Congress might or
might not have intended. While it is fair to criticize a legislative body
for having failed to articulate the norms it imposes, it is less so to
choose some particular normative statement that Congress might not
itself have chosen and criticize the statute from that perspective.
Accordingly, it seems best to use what may be regarded as a minimal or threshhold statement of the meaning of equality, expecting that
Congress might have meant at least this when it acted. In this connection, it seems safe to assume that the thrust of the Age Discrimination
Act, like most non-discrimination legislation, is to say that although it
may be rational for some purpose, and therefore constitutional, to treat
members of some group differently from the rest of the population, it is
wrong in policy to do so (at least when that would be disadvantageous
37. Id. § 90.14.
38. Id. § 90.15.
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to members of the group). This group should, therefore, ordinarily be
treated as if its defining characteristic-race, gender, handicap or, in

this case, age-does not exist or is not relevant to governmental action.
There is, as we have seen, reason to believe that Congress meant to do
just this: to declare that age should not be considered a relevant crite-

rion for decision-making about people in federally-supported programs.3 9 That is not necessarily to say, as the Civil Rights Commission

seems to have thought, that people of all ages must receive mathematically proportionate services or opportunities; rather, it implies that factors other than age must be used in deciding how persons should be
treated. It is also plain that Congress believed such a declaration necessary because it understood that old (and young) people were excluded from fair consideration just because they were old or young,
although such practices might formally be explained on other grounds
(e.g., old people are less likely than younger people to be physically fit).
In short, Congress seems to have perceived a disvaluing of people because of their age, and this at least it meant to prohibit, 4s it had pro-

hibited the disvaluing of women and of members of minority racial
groups.
If these modest assumptions are sound, the proponents of the Age
Discrimination Act at least intended to declare the rights of young and
old people not to be discounted in the process of decision-making. This
intention provides only a minimal notion of equality; nonetheless,
something very much like it has been described by Professor Dworkin
as the commonly accepted basis of political morality:
Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is,
as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and
with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming
and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be
lived. Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect. It must not distribute
goods or opportunities unequally on the ground that some citizens
are entitled to more because they are worthy of more concern. It
must not constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's conception
of the good life or one group's is nobler or superior to another's.
These postulates, taken together, state what might be called a liberal
conception of equality .... 40
This notion of equality, it should be said, does not state a principle
of distribution, but one of process. Professor Dworkin distinguishes between a right to equal treatment and the right to treatment as an equal.
39. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
40. DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 272-73.
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The latter is an entitlement to equal concern and respect in decisions
about the allocation of goods and opportunities, but does not imply
that each person will receive a proportionate amount of goods. It is not
right for the government to ignore the interests of the wealthy in deciding tax policy, but the right to be attended to does not mean that, on
balance, other interests cannot require a higher tax upon the rich than
the poor. The right to equal treatment-to equal distribution-is
sometimes available, but is a derivative rather than the primary claim
to equality; it is the right to treatment as an equal that must be ac4
corded everyone by government. '
So minimal a definition of the right of equality can surely be criticized for failing to deal with distributive issues. 42 In particular, it does
not seem that the requirement of equality as a matter of process concerns itself much with whether there are "basic" or "primary" goods to
43
which everyone is positively entitled, and what those goods might be.
Nor does this principle offer a basis for evaluating particular allocative
decisions as long as essential democratic process notions are satisfied.
For our purposes, however, Professor Dworkin's definition is helpful in
indicating certain kinds of threshhold questions that antedate consideration of distributive issues. Is it true that children are denied "equal
concern" by governments, even assuming that older citizens are so denied? Is it true that "equal respect" means the same thing for children
that it does for other members of the community? If these assumptions
are not well founded, then there may be no need to consider the concededly harder question of remedies for our neglect of the young. And,
as it happens, neither of these propositions is plainly founded in our
experience or theory.
EQUALITY OF CONCERN FOR YOUNG AND OLD PERSONS

We have postulated that equality requires governments to demonstrate equal concern and equal respect for all whom they govern. Although Professor Dworkin defines "concern" and "respect" separately,
41. Id. at 273.

42. See, e.g., Berm, Egalitarianism and the Equal Consideration of Interests, in NoMos IX:
EQUALITY 62-68 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1967); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 507-10
(1971) [hereinafter cited as RAWLS].

43. This is not to say that Professor Dworkin would declare that there are no such goods.
Indeed, he suggests that elementary (but not law school) education is something that must be
provided for everyone because its lack may prevent persons from leading a useful life. DWORKIN,
supra note 33, at 227. This suggestion in turn may indicate that certain allocations are related to

respect and liberty insofar as they are necessary to allow all persons to formulate the life plans
which entitlements to respect must honor. See id. See also RAWLS, supra note 42, at 507-10.
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it is not clear how sharply he would differentiate their applications. It
is, however, useful to treat these qualities separately in talking about
young and old persons.
The principle that governments show equal concern for all groups
in the community is most directly related to allocations of goods, services and opportunities, and has less to do with assurances regarding
liberties. A central question, plainly, is whether it is necessary to declare, as we suppose the Act to have done, that young and old persons
are entitled to that kind of equality. Such a declaration would be most
appropriate, of course, if those administering federally-supported programs in fact displayed lack of interest in the well-being of the young
or the elderly and, because of that disinterest, failed to allocate appropriate resources to them.
An argument can be made that a statement of this kind is important with respect to the elderly. Cultural attitudes towards older people
are not so clear that affirmation of their right to equal concern is on its
face unnecessary. It is certainly true that our Biblical traditions demand great respect for the aged: it was a great thing for Methuselah to
survive longer than most empires. In the Middle Eastern tradition, age
imports wisdom and experience, which in turn require veneration and
deference. It is equally true, however, that few people now look forward to old age with enthusiasm; most of us attend more to the loss of
faculties and health than to any anticipated increase in wisdom. Moreover, negative feelings about our own old age are supported by social
values which emphasize strength and continued achievement. Older
people have not done much for us recently, as the phrase goes; to the
extent that they continue to occupy positions of power or hold wealth,
they do so against the interest of those who believe themselves more
vigorous, imaginative and productive. And, to the extent that older
people do not have power or wealth, they are sometimes viewed as consumers of scarce resources that might better be used in other
directions."4
Because there is at the same time a desire to remove the elderly
from life schemes they have chosen and to view distributions of goods
to them as wasteful, Congress might reasonably have assumed the federal programs would reflect these attitudes. Whether Congress was
right in its apprehension regarding lack of concern for the elderly in the
practices of federally-supported programs is another matter. Certainly
they believed this to be so, and the Civil Rights Commission, for its
44. This summary draws heavily on P. SLATER, FOOTHOLDS 4347 (1977).
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part, reported that "discrimination on the basis of age is widespread. '45
The inadequacy of the Commission's definition of discrimination and
the scanty data available nevertheless justify caution in accepting this
46
conclusion.
Whatever may be true of older citizens, however, it is hard to take
seriously any suggestion that American society displays less than full
concern for its young members. On the contrary, there is no group
whose interests we have sought so hard to define and serve, or to whom
we have distributed so much of our public resources. Foreign observers since the American Revolution have commented on the child-centered character of our culture, 47 and it has become a commonplace
that, shortly after the Civil War, America entered upon "the century of
the child."' 48 There is, moreover, no sign that our commitment to the
young has waned. Just as children represent a kind of immortality for
their parents, so they embody the general society's hopes for improvement, if not perfection.
The American attitude towards children is not merely a matter of
posture. We have created for young people a "right" to a prolonged
adolescence, 49 during which their maintenance is assured (through the
family or, failing that, the juvenile court or other agencies), their education is provided through professional teachers, and a host of services is
made available (voluntarily or involuntarily) to promote their development into "good, sound, adult citizenship." Indeed, our public concern
for children is such that child-rearing is only initially left to the family
itself; a variety of public agencies stand ready to "support" it or replace it at the first indication of dysfunction.50
It is true that this traditional American devotion to the welfare of
children seems to be contradicted by the Civil Rights Commission's
undifferentiated conclusion of "widespread" age discrimination, since
the Commission undertook to examine discrimination against young as
45. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART I), supra note 29, at 3. Indeed, the problem seemed so
grave that the Commission recommended amendment of the Act so as to ban any-not merely
..unreasonable"-discrimination, claiming to find no situation where administrative action based
on age could be regarded as reasonable. Id. at 86-87.
46. For a general attack on the Commission's methodology and conclusions, see Schuck,
supra note 22.
47. See, e.g., A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 192-97 (H. Reeve trans. 1945).
48. See, e.g., 3 A. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY 131 (1917);

Teitelbaum & Harris, Some HistoricalPerspectives On GovernmentalRegulations of Children and
Parents, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 1, 20-31 (L. Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND CONTROL].
49. BEYOND CONTROL, supra note 48, at 29-31.
50. See id. at 20-31; C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1975).
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well as old people. 5' What is remarkable about the Commission's
study, however, is not that it reveals inconsistency between our traditional concern for children and the practices of federally funded agencies, but that the data in fact reveal no lack of services for children,
even using a methodology that counts every disparity in resource allocation as an instance of potential discrimination and that does not consider the services provided to children through public elementary and
secondary education or the juvenile courts. Because the conclusion
that young people are denied resources is impeached by the evidence
adduced by the Commission, careful review of the Commission's findings seems warranted.
Title XX Funds
Title XX of the Social Security Act 52 comprises much of what is

considered "welfare," including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicaid, WRI
(providing, among other things, family planning and protective services
without regard to income), and Child Welfare Services (CWS). Although the Commission found age discrimination in several areas
under Title XX programs, it is hard to see how young people suffered
thereby. Overall, one-third of all recipients of funds in fiscal year 1976
were children. More particularly, 43% of all primary recipients of
AFDC, 24% of all Income Eligible recipients, 57% of beneficiaries of
53
WRI services, and 36% of Medicaid beneficiaries were young people.
These
programs made up 81% of all program commitments under Title
XX. 54 Indeed, the Commission's findings of discrimination against
older persons seem to be explained by the heavy concentration of serv55
ices for children.
51. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART I), sypra note 29, at 4.

52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397f (1976).
53. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART I), supra note 29, at 25-26.
54. Id.
55. Consider, for example, the testimony of Orlando Romero, Director of the Denver Department of Social Services:
What has happened is the workload we have been given in terms of child abuse and
neglect and the areas of families, this has taken almost all our resources, and what we
have basically said is that we will pay as much attention as we possibly can to the protection of the aged in terms of exploitation or abuse. We have tried to give emphasis to
nursing home placement. . . and that's about the extent of it. The rest of the staff we
have had has been pretty well delegated to the protection of children.
AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART I), supra note 29, at 27.
This picture is further confirmed by examination of Title XX expenditures in 1977. During
that fiscal year, 24.1% of the budget was devoted to child care, 8.2% to substitute care for children
and 8.1% to protective services for children. Id. at 39, Table 1.3. Over 40% of the budget went
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CETA Programs
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973
(CETA) 56 is designed to support programs providing job training and
employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, unemployed and underemployed persons. 57 While the Commission, on extremely doubtful information, 58 concluded that age discrimination
existed in several areas, 59 what discrimination there might have been
did not operate against young people. On the contrary, persons under
19 (as well as those between 19 and 21) appear to be significantly overrepresented in the population served by CETA programs. Whereas
youths under 19 composed 17.8% of the total unemployed population
in 1977, about 31% of the enrollees under Title I of the act belonged to
that age group. 6° And, when figures for three CETA programs in 1976
were aggregated, a high rate of representation of young persons was
also found. The youngest group made up 26.5% of all enrollees in these
programs but constituted only 17.1% of the unemployed population, as
defined for purposes of the Act.6 1 Testimony before the Civil Rights
Commission suggested that program administrators considered youth
more politically visible, more "appropriate" for CETA (as opposed to
on-the-job) training, and in other ways more to be preferred as
62
enrollees.
Food Stamps
63
Food stamp programs provide benefits to needy households,
some of which overlap with the population receiving AFDC funds
under Title XX. The data available to the Commission included only
absolute numbers of participants by age; information concerning persons who were eligible on need grounds but did not participate was
unavailable. 64 Accordingly, no conclusions can be drawn about maldirectly to child-serving programs, and children also received some significant parts of other

programs.
56. 29 U.S.C.
57. Id. § 801.

§§ 801-992 (1976).

58. The Commission conceded the weakness of its data. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II),
supra note 29, at 130-31.
59. Id. at 117.
60. Id. at 133. The high rate of service to young people was even greater in fiscal years 1975
and 1976. In the former, persons under 19 made up 18% of the unemployed population but 41.4%
of Title I enrollees; in 1976, the figures were 17.1% and 35.9%. Id. at 140, Table 4.8.
61. Id. at 135, Table 4.5.
62. See id. at 140-43.
63. Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1976).
64. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II), supra note 29, at 210.
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distribution of food stamp funds. Plainly, however, the current programs serve the young to a considerable degree. Participants between
the ages of 0-14 made up 41.4% of the population served in 1976, and
youths between 15 and 19 composed another 11.7% of the benefitted
population. In contrast, persons over 65 made up only 6.5% of the
65
participants.
Adult and VocationalEducation
The Commission's investigation of educational opportunities focussed on adult basic education, 66 vocational education 67 and higher
education. The first of these has no relevance for children under 16,68
who are in any event subject to compulsory school attendance by state
laws. The last is likewise of no immediate consequence for most young
people, however much it may guide their choices and aspirations while
in secondary school. Vocational education is available to youth as well
as adults, but here the data were extremely sketchy. Again, however,
these imperfect data indicated that resources are significantly concentrated on younger persons. Of the approximately 17 million persons
expected to be enrolled in vocational education programs during the
1978-79 school year, it was projected that more than half (9.2 million)
69
would be secondary education students.
Vocational Rehabilitation
The vocational rehabilitation services programs authorize provision of grants to states to meet part of the cost of rehabilitating handicapped individuals for gainful employment. 70 For each of the five
years studied, between 13.4% and 14.2% of all participants were under
18 and another 10% to 11.5% were 18 or 19 years old.7 ' During that
period, at least 23% of rehabilitated persons were 19 years of age or
younger, 72 while less than one-quarter of the participants were 45 years
or older. 73 This does not mean, necessarily, that there was age discrimination, because the program expressly emphasized service for the se65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.

72.
73.

Id. at 210-11.
Adult Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1211 (1976).
Vocational Education Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2461 (1976).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202 (1976).
AGE DISCRIMINATION, PART II, supra note 29, at 179.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976).
AGE DISCRIMINATION, PART II, supra note 29, at 231, Table 7.1.
Id.
Id.
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verely handicapped 74 and data concerning severity of hardship was
only available for persons between the ages of 20 and 64. It is clear,
however, that a substantial number of persons 19 and younger, even if
severely handicapped, would be too young to undertake vocational rehabilitation or would be engaged in school programs that did not focus
on vocational rehabilitation. Moreover, despite a prohibition in federal
regulations against the use of upper and lower age limits, a number of
state agencies had adopted age floors in order to concentrate their efforts on persons for whom occupational objectives could be determined
or who would be of employable age when rehabilitation was completed. 75 The likelihood that persons under 14 or 16 were considered
unready for vocational services heightens the significance of the large
population under 19 years of age who participated in these programs.
Medicaid
No evidence of discrimination against young persons under the
Medicaid program 76 appears from the report. While youth do not receive a large amount of Medicaid dollars, they make up a very large
proportion (47.9%) of all recipients. 77 The reason for the disparity between dollars spent and number of beneficiaries is obvious; children
under 21 have a lower rate of use of general hospital and skilled nursing home services. 78 Moreover, special programs, such as early periodic screening, diagnosis and treatment (EPSDT), are specially
available to young persons. 79 While it has been claimed that children
under 3 and over 6 are "underserved," 80 it is hard to view this circumstance as discrimination against young people as a class, although it
may argue for greater outreach.
Community Health Services Program
Authorized under Title III of the Public Health Service Act, 8 this
program provides a broad range of primary health and other services to
residents served by community health centers. 8 2 It is described as serv74. 29 U.S.C. § 720(a) (1976).
75. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II), supra note 29, at 245-46.
76. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396j (1976).
77. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II), supra note 29, at 264.

78. Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 273-76.
Id. at 275.
42 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1976).
AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II), supra note 29, at 286.
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ing primarily children and women, 83 a description that seems borne out
despite the lack of age data focusing directly on minority. In 1976,
31.3% of all users were under 13, and presumably children between 13
and 18 made up some significant proportion of the 47.5% of users between the ages of 13 and 44 (the next age category available). 84 The
assumption that children receive at least their share of services under
this program is strengthened by the statements of directors of neighborhood health centers, interviewed in the field, who frequently reported
that their programs leaned heavily toward serving children. The regional director of the United States Public Health Service in San Francisco spoke for many in saying that "it is just our belief that the payoff
is a little better the younger you have intervention, vis-A-vis preventive
activities." 85 In fact, it appears that emphasis on prevention sometimes
led to reserving certain services, such as dental care, entirely to the
86
young.
Community Mental Health Centers

The Commission did conclude that persons under 15 "are seriously under-represented among direct service recipients compared to
their representation in the general population"8 7 in connection with
services provided under the Community Mental Health Center Act. 88
That act provides federal financial assistance to public and nonprofit
agencies offering comprehensive mental health facilities to individuals.
The Commission's finding was based on the observations that children under 15 composed 28.6% of the "catchment area" population
(the population in the area served by a program), but only 13.4% of
new patient enrollments,89 and that as a general matter mental health
services exist for something less than 10% of the population under 18 in
need of those services. 9° This conclusion illustrates why the Commission's notion of discrimination is of doubtful value. Other commentators have already pointed out that inferring discrimination from
differences between population and rates of participation is improper.
Older people, it has been suggested, may need assistance but for their
own reason may be reluctant to enter into a service that they perceive
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 290. See also id. at 289-91.
Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 52.
42 U.S.C. § 2689 (1976).
AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II), supra note 29, at 65.
Id. at 82.
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as stigmatizing or even threatening to their independence. 9' It is likewise doubtful that older people perceive themselves as needing mental
health care to the extent that doctors so perceive them; consequently,
the latter's estimates of "needs" bear no significant relationship to the
likelihood that people will seek services.
These same points obtain with respect to young people, who may
equally view mental health services as something to be avoided or, at
least, not readily to be sought out. It is also important to talk accurately about the needs of young people for services, even from the point
of view of service providers. The Commission quotes estimates that
"10-12% of children and youth have psychological problems, ' 92 without specification of the gravity of the psychological problems of youth
when compared with the mental health needs of other segments of the
population. This is at best a careless use of evidence. Moreover, the

Commission's conclusion regarding underrepresentation of young people in mental health services is impeached to some extent (although the
Commission does not say so) by the data it uses to demonstrate discrimination against older persons. These figures indicate a sharp increase in new cases of psychopathology associated with age: whereas
there are only 2.3 cases of psychopathology per 100,000 population for
persons under age 15, the rate rises to 93 per 100,000 population for
persons between 35 and 64 and to an astounding 236.1 cases per
100,000 for persons over 65.93 If these data are useful at all, they suggest that children only rarely demonstrate the severest forms of mental
health disorder and arguably do not need these services equally, except
on the Commission's mechanical definition.
It further bears noting that the study does not consider adequately
whether other sources of mental health treatment are available for children. In fact, school systems (through special education services, guidance and counselling programs and the like), juvenile courts and the
general mental health system provide services for children which make
reliance on community mental health services less necessary or likely.
Because the focus of the Commission was limited to implementation of
particular programs, however, this qualification on need went
unmentioned.
Finally, confusion concerning the meaning of discrimination is revealed by an implication that parental consent requirements contribute
91. Schuck, supra note 22, at 52.
92. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II), supra note 29, at 82.

93. Id. at 81.
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to discrimination against young people. 94 It is hard to see how one can
claim discrimination against people who cannot or will not participate
in a program. And, if the implication is that such requirements are
frivolous and inappropriate, surely the basis for that suggestion requires more careful exploration than the Commission gives it. Indeed,
nondiscrimination seems to require forcing people defined as needy by
a program to participate in that program-a definition that has, as we
will see, particular significance in connection with children.
Legal Services
The last program studied involved provision of legal services
under the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974. 95 There were, as it
happened, virtually no age data available; however, the Commission
reported that most projects served relatively small proportions of clients between the ages of 6 and 15.96 Although the data presented is
almost wholly anecdotal, it has what is sometimes called face validityit seems right. A finding of discrimination in the administration of programs is, however, hard to justify on this basis. There was, in the first
place, no information on need for legal services among this age group
and there is every reason to think that very young persons are relatively
infrequently involved with the legal system. Even where need exists (as
with juvenile delinquency proceedings), the Commission has no information concerning the extent to which agencies it did not examine
(public defender services or appointed counsel systems, for example)
adequately served children. Moreover, the Commission, and many of
the witnesses appearing before it, failed to distinguish between a need
for legal services in the sense that there is an unmet right to assistance,
and a need for legal services in the sense that the law does not, but
should, provide a right to counsel in certain situations. Thus, while
witnesses stated that they did not provide legal services to children for
matters such as neglect proceedings and school disciplinary hearings, 97
many jurisdictions do not provide for independent assistance for the
child in those settings. 98 Some part of the unmet "need" is not a conse94. Id. at 82-84.
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-2996 (1976).
96. AGE DISCRIMINATION (PART II), supra note 29, at 107-08.
97. Id.
98. Although authorities have recommended provision of counsel for children who are the
subjects of neglect proceedings, e.g., HA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties 71-74 (1979), not all jurisdictions have adopted or practically
implemented that procedure. And in school disciplinary proceedings, it is clear that schools are
not constitutionally obligated to provide (or perhaps even allow) attorneys where short suspensions are involved. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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quence of discrimination by agencies, but a consequence of the failure
of the substantive law to agree that need exists for children in such
matters.
It appears, therefore, that if the purpose of the Age Discrimination
Act was to establish a principle that all people, regardless of age, are
entitled to equal concern by government, it was unnecessary to include
young people within the statute's coverage. The same conclusion
would be reached if Congress simply intended to declare an intent that
persons not be denied access to governmental resources because of
their age. There is no evidence that children are in fact denied access
to funds or services and considerable reason to think that they receive
some kind of preference in that regard. Indeed, this last proposition is
truer than even the Commission's data suggest. The Commission studied only nine programs, and its selection process emphasized the potential existence of discrimination. Had other programs been examined,
the conclusion that children are an object of special social concern
would have appeared even more strongly than it did in the data reported by the Commission. Federal programs directed especially toward young people would have counted, as would the vast resources
invested at the state and county levels in elementary and secondary
education programs, juvenile court services, and the like.
It is perhaps unnecessary to add that some groups of young people
may not share equally in the general societal concern for youth. Children who have mental or physical handicaps, and even those who belong to racial or ethnic minorities, might present special needs that are
insufficiently considered by governmental agencies, although this is not
always true. In any event, to say that these special needs ought to be
appreciated does not mean, certainly, that young people as a class suffer from lack of concern in American society.
EQUALITY OF RESPECT AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT

The Idea of Equal Respect
If children and young people are not subject to discrimination in
the sense that they are denied a fair measure of govenment concern, it
remains to ask if the Age Discrimination Act's extention to youth can
be justified on the broader principle it seems to announce: the general
equality of persons, regardless of age, within the political community.
This principle differs from that of equal concern by demanding respect
for the autonomy of persons as well as solicitude for their needs. It is
possible to take full account of the suffering to which people are ex-
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posed without according them respect as independent social actors. Indeed, the most paternalistic government may have such profound
concern for the well-being of its members that it will protect them from
making decisions that are injurious to their welfare. In doing so, however, government denies the value of its citizens' own views of their
welfare and therefore treats them as instruments for the achievement of
official concepts of how life should be lived.
It is not necessary for present purposes to explore fully the reasons
for insisting upon recognition of the moral autonomy or personality of
all members of the community; it is enough to say that non-utilitarians
such as Professor Dworkin hold that governments must respect (and
respect equally) the rights of people to determine how their lives should
be lived. 99 Concomitantly, government may not constrain these views,
or count those who hold them less worthy, because the majority think
these conceptions to be unwise or inutile.1t° It would accordingly be
wrong to say that blacks or homosexuals or Communists will be forbidden to marry or hold employment or receive welfare benefits because
they have espoused or adopted a scheme for living which others think
to be dangerous or evil. It does not follow, of course, that someone
who holds these attitudes or belongs to such a group will receive any
particular benefit or opportunity; equal respect is served when he or she
is not discounted in the competition for these reasons.'l0
In a real sense, nondiscrimination laws are vehicles for requiring
something like the principle of equal respect in practical circumstances.
It has already been suggested that equality of this kind does not determine any particular allocations but only requires that people not be
foreclosed from them because their views of life and therefore they
themselves are disvalued either generally or for purposes of the specific
benefit in question. The difficulty, of course, is that the actual basis for
decisions is rarely clear; it is hard to tell whether a person is denied an
opportunity because of a legitimate preference (e.g., this applicant is
99. The sense of autonomy, of awareness of self as the initiator of action that makes some
difference in the course of events, is taken by non-utilitarians as a central claim which must be
respected by individuals and governments. This idea is derived from Kant's principle of the inherent worth and dignity of man and has been expressed by Professors Rawls and Fried in terms
of "moral personality" and by Professor Benn as "natural personality." See RAWLS, supra note
42, at 505-10, C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 62-65 (1978); Benn, PersonalFreedom and Environmental Ethics:. The Moral Inequality ofSpecies, in 2 EQUALITY AND FREEDOM 401, 408 (G. Dorsey ed. 1977). For both Professor Rawls and Professor Dworkin, the claim of everyone to moral
personality lies at the base of the right to equality. See RAWLS, supra note 42, at 505-07; DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 272.
100. DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 272-76.

101. Id. at 276.

AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT AND YOUTH

incapable or less capable than other applicants) or because of some
illegitimate preference. Where the applicant is a member of a group,
the problem will be even greater to the extent that some plausible relation exists in fact between the group and the criteria for the opportunity. If women who seek an employment opportunity requiring
strength or speed are denied that opportunity, it is difficult to say
whether it was denied because these women were too slow or weak,
which would not offend the principle of equal respect, or because, in
the decision-maker's view, they had no business seeking work outside
the home.
Taking the House Report at its word, the Age Discrimination Act
did indeed declare that age, like race and sex, is an "irrelevant factor"
which should not be relied upon in decision-making. 0 2 Clearly, the
House used this phrase as it has in other nondiscrimination laws, since
it expressly analogized age to race, sex, national origin and religion.
This apparently means that age should not be employed as a sufficient
or even a presumptive criterion of access to benefits or opportunities. It
is worth considering, however, how radical that proposition would be
with respect to young people and ultimately whether it is likely that
Congress meant to establish such a proposition as a matter of national
policy.
Equality of Respect and Young People
If there is any one thing that is clear about the cultural and legal
position occupied by young people, it is that they are not accorded the
same respect enjoyed by adults in deciding how their lives should be
lived. The view that children are dependent social actors is a cultural
constant that finds expression throughout our positive law and in constitutional doctrine. Statutory and common law rules particularly exclude young people at various ages from every major decision other
people make about their life plans, including marriage, 0 3 employment, °4 entrance into civil contractual relationships' 0 5 and the
102. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
103. Typically, persons under 18 years of age are not allowed to marry, at least without parental permission. See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 135-38 (3d ed. 1980); UNIFORM MARRIAGE

& DIVORCE ACT §§ 203, 208, 9A U.L.A. 102, 110 (1979).
104. Every state has laws prohibiting employment of children below a stated age in the general labor market and/or regulating the hours of employment available to minors. See A. SussMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 39-42 (1977).

105. See general, IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 227 (1963).
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franchise.I°6 These and a host of other laws are explicitly founded on
the belief that the judgments of young people, by reason of immaturity
and inexperience, cannot be granted the respect which must be accorded those of adults. 0 7 Whereas the ability to value choices ration-

ally and to form even unwise schemes for living is conventionally
recognized for adults, it is equally conventionally denied to youth.
The greatest instance of the special and unequal position of youth
lies, however, not in these specific limitations on choice, although they
are significant, nor even in the institution of compulsory education
which mandatorily determines the greatest part of the daily life of
youths under 16, but in the universal requirement that children submit
to the authority of parents and persons in loco parentis. This requirement, which is expressed in juvenile codes creating jurisdiction over

"incorrigible" and "runaway" children,108 places children in a true status condition, in which their behavior is not governed by generally applicable rules but by the private will of other individuals (their parents
or guardians). 10 9 It hardly requires stating that government by personal domination would violate any definition of equal respect."t 0
106. The twenty-sixth amendment sets the age for voting in federal elections at 18. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
107. See, e.g., In re Barbara Haven, 86 Pa. D. & C. 141 (Orphans Ct. 1953), quoted in C.
FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 613 (2d ed. 1976), discussing a state law providing that persons under 16 could only be married upon a finding of
"special circumstances" by the Orphans Court:
[O]ur legislature enacted the current law, apparently concluding that one in the sunlight
of youth, standing on the threshhold of life, should not walk precipitously into the marriage chamber, but first should look with calm deliberation whether the step is both
desirable and safe.
The statute in question. . . fulfills a two-fold function in protecting marriage as an
estate and in placing a restraining hand upon the shoulder of impetuous youth.
See also McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 A. 402 (1920) (infant may disaffirm contracts because he is entitled to protection against immaturity and improvidence which may lead
him into making unwise bargains).
108. See BEYOND CONTROL, supra note 48, at Appendix, for a survey of various legislative
treatments of noncriminal misbehavior by children.
109. "Status" is used here in the traditional sense of government by personal dominationthat is, by the will of private parties-rather than government by the rule of law. The classic
instance of status is, of course, the Roman family, where the father had entire power over the
conduct and fate of those under hispotestas. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 133 (1 864). Government
by rule of law, in contrast, implies that the behavior and liberty of persons is governed by uniform
and general legal commands; it is based expressly on the conviction that social order achieved by
the personal domination of some individuals over others is intolerable. See Katz & Teitelbaum,
PINS Jurisdiction,The Vagueness Doctrine, andthe Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Katz & Teitelbaum]. This article also appears in BEYOND CONTROL, supra note 48,
at 201.
110. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886): "[Tihe very idea that one may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living . . .at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." On the
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Whereas government by generally applicable rules treats all persons
equally and allows them, within defined and reviewable limits, to order
their conduct as they like, status presupposes no equality of treatment.
Decision-making is left to the discretion of private actors, who are free
to determine their own agenda for those subject to that discretion.
Thus, one child may be required to work after school by his parents
and another forbidden to do so; one may be permitted to stay out until
10:00 p.m. and another only until 9:00. The only generally applicable
rule for children is one of obedience to parental commands, and such a
rule plainly represents the antithesis of respect for individual choices
about how life should be lived.
The proposition that children do not have the same range of
choice granted to adults also finds expression in constitutional doctrine.
It is not true that children entirely lack rights to autonomy under the
Constitution;" l indeed, the Supreme Court has held virtually all liberties recognized for adults to be applicable to children under some circumstances. Claims by young people to freedom of speech, 12 to rights
of choice in private areas of decision, 1 3 and to liberty in connection
with state-initiated deprivations of physical freedom' " 4 have all received sympathetic attention by the Court.
On the other hand, it is also plain that while children are entitled
to some measure of respect, their ambit of freedom is less extensive
than that enjoyed by adults, particularly where matters of choice are
directly involved. The narrower range of respect is reflected both in
particular constitutional decisions and in the standards by which restrictions on liberty affecting children are measured. For example, it is
generally true that, when "fundamental liberties" of adults are restricted by laws, the Court will bring strict scrutiny to the limitation
and, in particular, will only sustain the law if the state can demonstrate
that the restriction is necessary to accomplish some compelling governmental purpose." 5 The Court has routinely observed, however, that
issue of personal domination and juvenile court status offense jurisdiction, see generally Katz &
Teitelbaum, supra note 109.
111. The Court has repeatedly declared that the Constitution is not for adults alone. See, e.g.,
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976); Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
112. E.g., Erznozick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
113. E.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (access to contraceptives);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (abortion).
114. E.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (both concern
juvenile delinquency proceedings).
115. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).
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even in these areas "the power of the state to control the conduct 116
adults."'
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Thus, while children are not entirely without first amendment rights,
the Court in Ginsberg v. New York" 1 7 upheld a statute restricting the
sale of sexually oriented material to minors which concedely would
have been unconstitutional with respect to adults. Mr. Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion explained this result in terms of a lesser ability of
children to decide what they should and should not read:
I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such
a premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children of
other rights--the right to marry, for example, or the right to vote- 8
deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults."
Other decisions have sounded the same theme. In Carey v. Population Services International,"9 the Court held that while a law prohibiting access to contraceptives implicated what is generally a fundamental
privacy interest, it would not apply the same strict scrutiny to restrictions on access by children that would be used for adults. The test
employed was not simply whether an adult could be denied the interest
involved, but whether the privacy restriction served "any significant
state interest . . . that is not present in the case of an adult."' 20 This
less rigorous standard of review is appropriate, the opinion explains,
"both because of the State's greater latitude to regulate the conduct of
children, and because the right of privacy implicated here is 'the interest in making certain kinds of important decisions'. . . and the law has
generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability for making im2
portant decisions."' '
Thus, while children are not, as a constitutional matter, wholly
lacking in autonomy, their decisions about how to conduct their lives
are not uniformly entitled to the same deference that adults enjoy in
116. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1979), quoting and reaf-

firming this proposition.
117. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

118. Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring).
119. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
120. Id. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75).

121. Id. at 693 n. 15 (citations omitted). Only last term, the Court once again had occasion to
reiterate its view that because "minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them," the state may limit the freedom of
children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially
serious consequences. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
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the face of state regulation. It may further be true that young people
are entitled to very little deference when the agency imposing its judgments on the child is the family rather than the state. A long line of
cases, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska 22 in 1923 and continuing
through Parham v. JR. 123 last term, with many stops in between, 24 has
supported parental decision-making against government interference.
With what seems to be increasing strength, the Court has emphasized
the parental role in inculcating "our most cherished values, moral and
cultural,"' 125 and declared that role to be established "beyond debate as
26
an enduring American tradition."'
These cases go some distance toward confirming the proposition
that children occupy a status in the true sense. Perhaps recognizing this
result, the Court has also observed that the tradition of parental authority is consistent with and indeed necessary for the development of that
individual autonomy which children will ultimately possess. "Legal restrictions on minors," it remarked, "especially those supportive of the
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding."' 127 It is worth noting that this justification
might well command the agreement of legal philosophers as well; certainly it resembles to an extent Professor Fried's explanation of the notion of a right to familial control:
There are corresponding advantages to the child in recognizing family authority .... [The sense of ourselves as unique, particular beings] would be undermined if, for instance, we were bred "to order"
according to some plan. The random biological hazard of our parents' mating affirms that we belong to ourselves, for no one planned
it. And our uniqueness is the sign of our individuality. Now, this
conceptual advantage is carried forward by affirming that our arents not only conceived us but also transmitted through personal love
our most primitive emotional formation. Belonging at first to our
replace, we have a chance of believing we
parents, whom we will
128
belong to ourselves.
Since the purpose of this discussion is to describe the extent to which
122. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
123.

442 U.S. 584 (1979).

124. Among those stops are Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality
opinion and opinion of Mr. Justice Powell); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
125. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
126. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
127. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979).
128. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 155 (1978).
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children are or are not treated as equals, now is not the occasion to
raise doubts about the adequacy of this rationale. It is enough for the
moment to observe that, while plenary control is entirely sensible for
infants, an important part of growth and maturity lies in learning to
make one's own decisions. A body of law that requires uniform obedience to the choices of others---even the choices of one's parents-seems
hard to reconcile with the developed sense of autonomy we will shortly
expect of a 16-year-old youth. 2 9 At the same time, the existence of that
body of law says much about the law's attitude toward claims by young
people to determination of their own life plans.
Beyond question, then, to treat youth as an irrelevant or abritrary
factor for deciding on the treatment of persons would represent a radical departure from current laws, practices, and constitutional doctrines.
It would accomplish with one stroke more than even the most committed proponent of "children's liberation" could have expected over years
of advocacy. Of course, every nondiscrimination statute is intended to
work a departure from tradition; it is precisely the existence of a tradition of unequal treatment that calls such laws into existence. And it is
also true that the fact of constitutional sanction for unequal treatment
does not demand congressional inaction. As we have seen, most recent
nondiscrimination laws have been enacted because constitutional doctrine did not reach groups or practices thought to require protection or
disapproval. 30 Nevertheless, it is simply inconceivable that Congress
genuinely meant to declare the foregoing laws and doctrines entirely
wrong in policy and to say that age, or at least youth, cannot serve as a
valid indicator of fitness for choice.
It is surely plain that our laws and attitudes are correct in treating
youth as a relevant factor in connection with respect for choice. To a
certain point, it is not only a good but a perfect indicator of the capacity to form intelligent views about how life should be lived. At the
simplest level, we know to a certainty that very small children cannot
survive apart from adult control and maintenance. They cannot feed
themselves or secure food; they cannot cross streets safely or protect
themselves from any other kind of harm they might encounter. Economically, young children have no place of any sort; they cannot produce or gain access unaided to consumer goods of any kind.
Intellectually, even older children have small experience, undeveloped
129. See Katz & Teitelbaum, supra note 109, at 17-20.
130. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
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cognitive skills' 3' and immature moral judgment.

32

Very young peo-

ple are viewed in every culture as dependent social actors and, at least
short of adolescence, are so treated out of obvious necessity rather than
any subtler motive.

It is also true that as one goes from infancy to the last years of
minority, youth is increasingly less well correlated with capacity to
make important decisions. This is as it must be, since we expect that,

upon reaching the age of 18 or 21, members of the community will
have achieved the level of competence necessary for autonomous living. There is, however, a difference between saying that rules of thumb
about capacity are imperfect and saying that they are forbidden. Perhaps if there were not good reasons in everday experience for saying

that age is, at least in some stages, an excellent indicator of capacity for
choice, a rule prohibiting use of this characteristic would be entirely

appropriate. So Congress has already determined for race and gender.
Where, however, we know that age rules are at some levels entirely
valid and that they are often accurate indicators at all levels, categori33
cal prohibition of such rules makes little sense. 1
131. Young children typically have difficulty in seeing the temporal and causal relations between events. Those under eight, for example, often cannot order events chronologically or accurately judge duration. J. PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF TIME 10-29, 39-49 (1927); D.
FLAPAN, CHILDREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
FLAPAN]. Moreover, children (perhaps even until they are I I or 12 years old) frequently do not
understand causal relationships in physical matters; they tend to view all events as willed action or
do not see intermediate steps between apparent cause and effect. See J. PIAGET, THE CHILD'S
CONCEPTION OF PHYSICAL CAUSALITY 242-95 (1930); FLAPAN, spra, at 57-63.
132. See general, J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965).
133. It might be suggested that the Age Discrimination Act's emphasis on individualized determination of capacity is sensible in view of the imperfect fit between age and voting laws, compulsory education laws, marital age restrictions and the like. Certainly some 17-year-olds are as
competent to vote or marry as 18-year-olds who are entitled to engage in these activities, and
equally surely some 15-year-olds are better suited to employment than to high school. This observation may argue for increased flexibility in some areas, but does not mean that rules of thumb
regarding capacity are generally improper, even where we know they operate imperfectly.
The first reason for using rules of thumb has to do with the placement of a line at some age.
Certainly no one would seriously suggest that a five-year-old be examined individually for capacity to marry; however, drawing the line above that point will operate unfairly unless it is drawn at
so low a point that we can say with certainty that no younger person (or almost no younger
person) can engage in the questioned activity. This means that the line must be located at so low a
point that most of those just above the line will still in fact be incompetent for the purpose. Accordingly, it will be necessary to inquire into the capacities of large numbers of individuals.
This, in turn, presents several further problems. The first is one of convenience; a large and
expensive apparatus will be necessary to examine individually all of those who seek to marry,
vote, leave school, drive automobiles, leave home, drink alcohol and engage in any other activity
now categorically prohibited to youth. Moreover, that task would be immensely difficult as well
as inconvenient. In the first place, it is by no means clear that we know exactly what capacities we
want to evaluate in connection with each of these activities; exactly what, after all, might competence to leave home, vote and marry entail? In the second place, we do not know how to measure
these capacities with any degree of accuracy. While occasionally courts are called upon to deter-

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

To round out this argument, it may be worth observing that nothing in this philosophical notion of the right to respect is inconsistent
with treating children differently from adults. The claim to equality of
respect or moral personality is expressly founded on a notion of moral
agency: that is, on the assumption that persons are rationally able to
form life choices. However, it seems widely to be agreed that young
people as a group lack the moral agency on which claims to autonomy
are founded. 34 Sometimes the proposition that children have no
claims of this kind is made explicit. Mill, for example, observed that
his doctrine of liberty "is meant to apply only to human beings in the
maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of
young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood
or womanhood."' 135 By the same token, H.L.A. Hart and Stanley Benn
apparently agree that to speak of the "rights of animals or babies...
makes an idle use of the expression, a right. .. ,"136 It is in their view
inaccurate to confuse needs, which animals and children may have
(and which it may be wrong to deny) with the notion of their possessing
137
moral agency.
Perhaps more commonly, the exclusion of children from moral
personality is simply assumed as a definitional matter. Professor
Dworkin does not address particularly the place of young people
within his scheme, but it seems fair to infer that, so far as children
cannot in fact form rational choices about life, they lack the entitlement
to respect upon which equality is based. Professor Fried would seemingly reach the same conclusion and, indeed, suggests that at least very
young children can properly be viewed as extensions of their parents'
personalities. 138 It must follow that, to the extent children are viewed
mine the capacity of minors to marry, the standards to be used are generally vague and subjective;
moreover, they are applied only after a full evidentiary hearing. Large-scale administration, in
contrast, would suppose relatively specific criteria that could be ascertained easily and inexpensively. Finally, it should be clear that the problem of defining and measuring capacity really
means setting definitions and standards for a variety of kinds of competence. Capacity to marry,
to vote, to leave school and to leave home are all different notions which cannot be measured by a
single device. If we are genuinely concerned about accuracy, it will be necessary to devise and
administer valid and reliable tests that reflect each of the various kinds of capacities which young
people might assert. This enterprise will frequently be beyond our own capacity, both technically
and practically.
134. For a recent analysis and criticism of this conclusion, see L. HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND
THE STATE 47-60 (1980).

135. J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in THE UTILITARIANS 475, 484 (1961).
136. Bean, PersonalFreedom and Environmental Ethics.- The Moral Inequality of Species, in 2
EQUALITY AND FREEDOM 401, 405-06 (G. Dorsey ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Bean], discussing
Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175-91 (1955).
137. Benn, supra note 136, at 406.
138. C. FRIED, supra note 99, at 152-55.
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39
in this way, they claim no personality in their own right. 1
However one looks at it, therefore, it would be a genuinely remarkable step for Congress to declare that age is an "irrelevant factor"
in the same way that sex, race, color or religion is irrelevant to governmental or individual decision-making. Perhaps it is or should be irrelevent with respect to all persons, however old, who have once
reached the age of majority, although even that is a debatable question. 14 0 To extend the same proposition to the cradle, however, contradicts custom, law and legal theory as well as daily experience. Despite
the strong language of the House Report, it is ultimately impossible to
believe that the Age Discrimination Act meant to declare that persons
of all ages are entitled to decide upon their life plans, or even that they
are all presumptively entitled to do so.
The incongruity of treating very young persons as if they were entitled to equal respect may account in part for the very general exceptions engrafted onto the Act 14 ' and more fully articulated by the HEW
regulations adopted in furtherance of the Act.' 42 These exceptions al
low age to be taken into account when to do so is necessary to the
normal operation of a program or statutory objective, or when a program undertakes to provide benefits or assistance to persons on the basis of age, or when age is related to some characteristic necessary to the
accomplishment of the program's objectives and that characteristic is
otherwise hard to measure. Liberally interpreted, such exceptions may
well allow agencies to continue to use age classifications in much the
way they have always been employed. But if such broad qualifications
on a rule of equal respect are necessary to make the rule sensible, the
significance of the rule disappears.

Two

FURTHER ASSUMPTIONS OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT

It was suggested early in this discussion that the Age Discrimination Act embodies a special strategy for dealing with perceived inequal139. Professor Rawls, it should be said, does view children as entitled to equal justice, because
his formulation emphasizes as the criterion of personality potential rather than realized capacity
to decide upon a life plan and to make moral judgments. This flows from the hypothetical nature
of the contract from which principles of justice are derived; because there were no actual participants to the agreement, possession of mature facilities is unnecessary, as long as persons would at
some time possess those faculties and thus, presumably, would reach the same conclusions as any
other persons. See RAWLS, supra note 42, at 506-07. At the same time, it is also clear that surrogates will exercise the rights of children until their capacity is in fact realized, indicating that
actual capacity has considerable importance in Professor Rawls' scheme.
140. See generally Schuck, supra note 22.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1) (1976).
142. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
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ities of treatment. Although such legislation is sometimes passed only
to implement requirements of equal treatment that courts have announced, it is often used to declare a national policy of equality where
differential treatment would not ordinarily offend constitutional doctrine. The thrust of most nondiscrimination laws is to say that although
it may be rational for some purpose, and therefore constitutional, to
treat group X differently from the rest of the population, it is wrong in
policy to do so (at least when that would be disadvantageous to members of group X). This group should, therefore, ordinarily be treated as
if its defining characteristic does not exist or is not relevant to governmental action.
This is no trivial declaration for Congress to make, since it imposes on local authorities a principle of equality that they have not
chosen and that would not be required of them as a federal constitutional matter. Presumably there must be firm national agreement that
the group in question has been treated unfairly by prevailing practices
and that a wise policy would be to provide group members with the
concern and respect given other members of the community. Such an
act should ultimately reveal through its terms or through administrative interpretation what "equal concern and respect" mean particularly,
and at the least the need for and right to these attitudes ought to be
clearly established.
It does not appear, however, that the drafters of the Age Discrimination Act looked carefully at what equality might mean in connection
with young people. We have already seen that, if the Act was intended
to declare that young people are entitled to the same concern for wellbeing that we show other members of society or to some "fair" share of
societal benefits and opportunities, its extension to youth seems unnecessary. If the Act had a further purpose of announcing the entitlement
of people of all ages to equal rights of autonomy and respect, it is hard
to believe that Congress genuinely meant such a declaration to apply to
children. Beyond these conclusions, there may be some value in exploring at least briefly two further assumptions that the Act might have
indulged, to indicate why careful thought about the substantive nature
of equality and about the special position of youth is important.
The Assumption that DiscriminationAgainst Young and Old Presents a
Single Problem
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the scope of the Age
Discrimination Act is that it proceeds from a set of false analogies
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which can be expressed by the notion that discrimination against the
old and the young are but parts of a single problem called "age discrimination." The first of these analogies is between old and young
people. It appears that the Act assumed that if old people are treated
differently because of age and it is wrong to so treat them, it must also
be wrong to treat young people differently from others because of age.
The second false analogy, which flows from the first, is that "age" is
like race or sex for purposes of a discrimination act.
With regard to the first of these points, Congress presumably intended to remedy perceived failures in concern and respect for the elderly by declaring that their needs and choices about life could not
properly be discounted on the sole basis that they were the needs and
choices of old people. It was also perceived that young people's capacities for choice are likewise discounted on the basis of age, and therefore
it seemed right to address the one together with the other. This analogy
fails, however, because the situations of old and young people are not
in fact very much alike. On the one hand, we have no cultural ambivalence about the value of young people in society; all of our cliches
about their representing the "hope of tomorrow" and "our greatest natural resource" bespeak concern for their development and success. For
the old, the situation is less filled with promise, and genuine concern
for their well-being may indeed often be absent. On the other hand,
the elderly as a group do have a valid claim to equal respect as autonomous social actors. Many children, in contrast, have not yet realized a
capacity for self-determination, a fact which we know surely to be true
of at least very young children. Young people present the classic case
for paternalistic control, whereas old people-absent disability-represent the group from whom paternalism might most readily be expected.
The second false analogy is between "age" as a classification and
"sex" and "race" as classifications. We know that the age discrimination law was modeled on sex and race discrimination statutes, 14 3 and it
is likely that Congress therefore assumed that what worked with the
last two would also work with age. However, sex and race are not like
age. The first two categories can be treated as a single issue because all
members of a gender or racial group can be treated as identically situated with respect to the group characteristic in question. All women
can be treated as equally women and all blacks or orientals as equally
black or oriental (and as equally members of racial minorities). Accordingly, a rule addressed to these characteristics will mean the same
143. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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thing to all members of the group. Concomitantly, there is no competition within the group for the scarce benefits for which they will be eligible. To give women some opportunity gives all women equally that
opportunity, denying it to none. That is not to say that members of a
group will not compete among themselves for particular jobs and opportunities, but their competition will be personal rather than based on
factors related to gender or race.
The situation with age is different because the old and young are
not identical in their characteristics within the group. Few statements
would mean the same to both. A rule that "Age must not be considered
in employment" may mean something to a person of 60 or even 90
years but cannot mean the same thing to a 3-year-old. The same is true
for most categorical statements that might be made with respect to opportunities and autonomy.
Moreover, the Act's assumption about the need to assure equality
of concern for young and old people may have positively mischievous
results from the point of view of the elderly. Because the Act set out to
remedy what it thought to be inattention to the needs of both young
and old people, it forbade discrimination against those groups but expressly allowed programs that provide services to these groups to continue to do so, without regard to requirements of equal treatment.144 If

young and old were identically situated with respect to need, or if resources were unlimited, this approach would present no special
problems. However, we know that resources are in fact scarce, and
neither the Act nor the Commission's report provides any basis for saying that the unmet needs of the young are as great as or greater than
those of the elderly. If, indeed, it is true (as seems to be the case) that
young people receive a very great portion of public wealth, it is possible
to argue that their inclusion in the statute serves to perpetuate existing
inequalities in resource allocation by allowing programs that prefer to
serve children to continue doing so at the expense of the elderly.
It should quickly be added that this argument may or may not be
correct. A variety of substantive conclusions about what equality
means can be reached. Plainly, relative need is a condition that can be
taken into account, as the distributive maxim, "To each according to
his needs" indicates. 4' 5 But the relative need of young and old for public resources is a disputable matter. At the most general level, an advo144. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1976). See also 45 C.F.R.

§§

90.14-90.15 (1979).

145. See, e.g., Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 31, 40 (R. Brandt ed. 1962), for

an argument that this maxim represents the most perfect form of equal distribution.
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cate for the interests of children might point to the profound
dependence of the young-their inability to secure their own needs for
survival-and argue for an especially great need for public assistance
on their part. He might also point out the existence of needs that are
peculiar to the young, such as basic education, which must be satisfied.
One who is particularly concerned with the welfare of the elderly might
respond that older people are more gravely at risk than the young,
since the latter ordinarily have the possibility of assistance from their
families or relatives whereas older people who cannot assure their own
survival have no recourse other than public assistance.
As one becomes more particular, matters become more rather than
less disputable. Given scarce resources of any sort, priorities must be
established which may have different meanings for different age
groups. Reservation of medication for the gravely ill in preference to
the moderately ill would occasion little argument, even if young people
were more likely to be gravely ill than older people and even if older
people would like to have the medicine to relieve their discomfort.
Equality is done on the theory that young and old people as groups are
not situated equally with regard to the distributional priority that has
been established. Other kinds of priorities may occasion greater concerns. The view can be taken that it is more valuable to use scarce
medical resources to prevent illness than to cure it,146 or to deal with
curable rather than chronic and incurable diseases. These decisions
might also allocate more services to young than to old patients and, in a
situation of grave scarcity, might leave large numbers of old people
unserved. Nevertheless, the fact of disproportionate allocation does
not constitute "unequal treatment" if the priority decision is acceptable;
as with the previous example, old and young people are not similarly
situated with regard to their needs for preventive or remedial care. It
is, of course, also arguable that the priority is "wrong" and should not
have been included in the distributive framework, on the ground that
the suffering of chronically ill older people should be given greater
weight than efforts to prevent disease for persons who are not in fact
yet ill.
If one includes criteria of equality other than need-and a case
can be made for defining equality in terms of "value" or "merit" or

146. For instances of just such a decision, see text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
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"deserts" 4 7-the potential for conflict between young and old increases even further. It would, indeed, be possible to review the entire
literature about what equality means, generally or in connection with
48
specific kinds of activities (such as allocation of health care services)
in deciding what distributions are appropriate for young and old people. The very fact that such an exercise could be undertaken reveals
the flaw in considering young and old people as a single class for purposes of a law requiring "equal treatment."
The Assumption that Provision of Resources Is a
Sufficient Measure of Equality
If the Age Discrimination Act's inclusion of young people may
come to be a source of regret for older citizens, there are also features
that will not necessarily be welcomed by advocates of rights of youth.
The Act seems to assume, and the Civil Rights Commission did assume, that proportionate provision of resources is a sufficient measure
of equality. We have already explored some of the difficulties with that
approach, but it should further be said that provision of resources may
be inconsistent with affording recipients equality of respect. Children
are the beneficiaries of the greatest part of every state and local budget
through elementary and secondary education programs, juvenile court
services and the like. They do not receive these benefits, however, because they apply for or want them, or even because these benefits are
due to all members of society. Rather, children are provided education
precisely because they are not equal to adults and because they "need"
these services in order to become adults under current notions of responsible adulthood. And, because children are not equals, they have
no right to say that they do not wish to accept the benefits provided
them.149 Accordingly, the very circumstance that indicates "equality"
147. The following familiar distributive statements reflect other criteria that might be incorporated in a definition of equality:
To each according to his need.
To each according to his worth.
To each according to his merit.
To each according to his work.
Vlastos, supra note 145, at 35.
148. For an indication of the breadth and complexity of the issues within this single area, see,
e.g., ETHICS AND HEALTH POLICY (R. Veatch & R. Branson, eds. 1976); MORAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE (S. Gorovitz et al., eds. 1976); J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO
DECIDES WHAT (1975).
149. The term "needs" can be used in two different senses. One suggests desires that should be
satisfied ("A starving man needs food"); the second has no necessary connection with desire ("A
mentally ill person needs electroconvulsive therapy"). These different senses say a great deal
about the positions of the persons to whom they are applied. For a discussion of this difference of
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for the Civil Rights Commission-provision of various kinds of services-may be a manifestation of the inequalities associated with youth
when those services are mandatorily provided. If elderly people are not
so thoroughly provided with services, it may be because they are unlikely to have such services imposed upon them according to an external notion of "need."
This is not to say that provision of these services to children may
not be related to equality of needs and certainly does not imply that
children ought to receive fewer of the resources available for distribution to the population. These decisions call for a highly refined notion
of equality which the Age Discrimination Act does not offer and which
there is not time here to explore. However, these observations do remind us that paternalistic as well as egalitarian schemes may devote
resources to the well-being, as they define it, of those they govern, and
that provision of resources cannot serve as a sufficient measure of
equality of treatment.
CONCLUSION

It is possible to regret the fact that closer thought was not given by
Congress to the complexities of dealing with atypical citizens, including
children, in our society. As a general proposition, laws derive their
model from the adult, competent person about whom categorical statements can readily be made. Having said, "All people should be allowed to do X," or "All people should be treated in Y fashion," one
then turns to justifications for and limitations on that general proposition. This approach even applies to most nondiscrimination legislation,
which deals with people who are politically marginal but otherwise fit
the general model. Indeed, the principal thrust of such laws is to eliminate the political marginality of such groups on the assumption that
their members will then be like the rest of the population.
Citizens who lack various kinds of capacities through immaturity,
accident or congenital disability are special cases for law, in part just
because the usual categorical statements cannot easily be applied to
them. It will be important, as we deal more and more with the legal
and social position of atypical citizens, to work out what equality
means for them. Perhaps, as the Supreme Court has suggested with
children, a very precise analysis of the kinds of opportunities, services
and burdens is required before the meaning of fairness can be estabmeaning in connection with the rights of children, see Teitelbaum, Foreword- The Meanings of
Rights of Children, 10 N.M.L. REV. 235 (1980).
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lished satisfactorily. What is clear is that the Age Discrimination Act,
although it dealt with one group plainly comprised of atypical citizens
(youth) and another that includes substantial numbers of (differently)
atypical members of the community, failed to realize both the variety
and the special character of the constituency it was addressing. In all
likelihood, some good will nevertheless come of the Act in respect of
older people, but its meaning for youth remains obscure because the
meaning of youth was obscure to the drafters of the Act.

